1) Executive Summary
In order to work at P5, you must have:
The CERN general emergency number ("Pompiers") is 74444.
In emergency underground, the lifts SHOULD be used for egress,
assuming they are still operational. They are encased in 15cm of reinforced concrete,
and are deliberately kept at over-pressure (to keep out any smoke or fumes).
The lifts and the air-supply are both on backed-up power.
Use the adjacent staircase if the lift is out of order.
If you are unable to do either, then wait just in front of the lift in the safe zone
(French word for this is "sas" = airlock),
which is also encased in concrete and is behind a fire-door.
If the "sas" is full, then wait in the stair-well, since it's also pressurised and encased in concrete.
2) Introduction - RAL/STFC aspects
The
STFC
Health and Safety Policy Document
makes explicit remarks about staff working at non-STFC sites:
"The 'duty of care' for health and safety includes responsibility for staff whilst travelling to
and working at non-STFC sites in the UK and overseas. At such sites STFC staff shall follow the
site's local rules with respect to health and safety. In such circumstances STFC management
maintain a responsibility to ensure that the procedures followed afford equivalent protection of
individual health and safety, and that, so far as reasonably practicable, staff are not placed at
greater risk by working at non STFC sites compared to similar work at an STFC site."
The document also states that at
"Non STFC sites/facilities (UK and non UK) where STFC staff undertake work":
STFC Safety, Health and Environmant (SHE) Policy/Code has
"No direct relevance except in establishing a benchmark for assessing the strength of local SHE management systems"
and
"The STFC owes a duty of care towards its staff wherever they undertake work (or travel) on Council business.
STFC staff working at non STFC sites must follow the local site SHE management systems.
In parallel STFC managers should ensure their staff undertake a risk assessment, mental or documented,
of their activities to determine their safety.
Such sites may be subject to a mixture of formal and informal review or audit by SHE Group
to provide managers with general assurance of a site/facility's safety."
Bottom line: it's the CERN Health and Safety Rules which you should be following.
Nevertheless, it would be prudent for all RAL CMS staff
to be fully aware of the relevant documents on the
STFC SHE web pages, particularly
RAL CMS staff are also encouraged to have read and be fully aware of the contents of the RAL "Safety Handbook" (revised November 2003) and be fully aware of the RAL SHE web site from which one can access the
The above web pages (needing RAL ID/Password, but not requiring PPTP to access them) appear deprecated since the introduction of STFC. So you may need to use the following links instead:
Remember that, as stated in the Foreword of the RAL Safety Handbook:
"Everyone has an obligation to take care of personal health and safety,
to avoid endangering others and to co-operate in the implementation of
safety measures."
Given the above policy that "STFC staff shall follow the site's local rules with respect to health and safety", in the remainder of this document, STFC/CCLRC/RAL safety information is cited for information only, usually in cases where the author has had trouble finding the CERN equivalent.
3) Introduction - CERN aspects
All RAL CMS staff working at CERN must respect all CERN safety rules and regulations, and should therefore have read and be fully aware of the contents of the
The PH Departmental Safety Officer (DSO) is currently (Jul-10)
Christopher Griggs, 16-3948.
"The Departmental Safety Officer [of PH]
manages the safety of: buildings, laboratories, workshops and storage areas of PH Department
as well as all physics experiments and members of experiment collaborations
and, in collaboration with the machine Departments, the safety of the experimental areas."
Further information about Safety at CERN is available at the following links:
CERN Safety is moving towards harmonisation with European Union Regulations, Directives and Standards. So any discrepancies with the UK legislation should gradually diminish.
The former CERN Technical Inspection and Safety (TIS) Department was disbanded at the end of 2003. It was replaced by a CERN Safety Commission (SC) Unit, attached to the Director General's Office. However, not all CERN documentation has been updated to reflect these changes. A "New approach to the implementation of Safety at CERN" was announced by the previous CERN Director-General in November 2006, and is now in operation. As described therein, all executive tasks aimed at ensuring the Safety of personnel and equipment becomes the sole responsibility of the Departments, which are also responsible for ensuring the effectiveness of their Safety actions. By executive is meant any act which ensures the application of Safety rules or the implementation of Safety measures (e.g. periodic inspections, implementation of general Safety measures, etc.). Furthermore, the CERN Safety Codes, Safety Instructions, Safety Notes and Safety Bulletins are being superseded by CERN Safety rules comprising Safety Regulations (SR), Safety Plans and Safety Procedures (SP), supported by General Safety Instructions (GSI) and Specific Safety Instructions (SSI). Meanwhile, as stated in SAPOCO 42, "The Safety Codes and Safety Instructions currently in force, under the scheme defined in document "Safety Policy at CERN" (version February 2003), will remain in force as such, ad interim, until their revision, or their transcription into new SRs, SPs and GSIs". Thus Safety policy is unchanged, only its method of being implemented has been altered. The implementation should be done via the new CERN Safety Management System, SMS, as explained to CMS in September 2007 by Elena Manola-Poggioli of SC-IE. The associated Hazards/Aspects and Risks/Impacts (HARI) Register (needs login with your CERN NICE account) is starting to be utilised. Revised Terms of reference of the Safety Commission and Membership and terms of reference of the Safety Policy Committee are in force.
As of 01-Jul-10, the CERN Safety Commission has been replaced by a CERN Occupational Health & Safety and Environmental Protection (HSE) Unit, which reports directly to the Director General, and the mandate has further evolved.
4) Introduction - CMS aspects
All RAL CMS staff working at CERN should have attended the CERN basic safety courses (now web-based at sir.cern.ch (need to have a valid CERN NICE account)) and thereby be trained for Levels 1+2 and Level 3. To work at P5/CMS, since early 2007 one is also required to have passed the CMS Level-4C Safety Training/Test. Having passed, one can later revisit the slides of Level-4C to remind oneself of issues, without being obliged to re-sit the concluding test! (This is useful, since the slides are frequently updated, as the hazards at P5 evolve.) The Level-4C slides appear largely to have replaced the CMS Safety Web Page, which has limited (somewhat out-of-date) content. Level 1-3 training is now only valid for 3 years; Level-4C is also valid for 3 years.
Since March 2007 you need a new CERN access card ("Mifare" with embedded RF-ID chip) to enter P5 (at the site entrance barrier and the card-reader to go underground). Since August 2007 a Mifare access card is also needed at the card-reader of the CERN tunnel between the Meyrin and Prevessin sites. Mifare cards have a capital "M" to the right of the CERN logo. They can be obtained from Building 55.
The CMS GLIMOS
(Group Leader in Matters of Safety),
is
Christoph Schaefer, 16-0202.
"The overall and final direct responsibility for all aspects of safety of an experiment
rests with the GLIMOS [...]. He is a member of the experiment collaboration
and has full authority over it in all safety matters. He follows the advice and opinion
of the experts on health and safety, who in their turn,
are responsible for the advice given.
[...]
The GLIMOS has a central and important role in the safety organisation for an experiment
in that he has the direct and total responsibility for the safety of his experiment.
[...] His position is on the hierarchical line for direct safety responsibility,
reporting directly to the Department Leader in safety matters."
Recently, the GLIMOS or Deputy GLIMOS has given a Safety talk in the opening Plenary session of each CMS-week.
These should be considered as obligatory reading:
The Technical Coordinator (TC) for CMS is
Austin Ball, 16-0408.
"When Technical Coordinators are appointed by the Leader of the Host Division,
they assume the role of GLIMOS. A Technical Coordinator may delegate the charge
of GLIMOS to another person in the collaboration with the agreement of the Collaboration
Spokesman and the Leader of the Host Division."
The Deputy GLIMOS for CMS is [New, 2011] Niels Dupont-Sagorin, 16-5186.
The Deputy Technical Coordinator for CMS is Wolfram Zeuner, 16-2541.
The Safety Coordinator for CMS is
Michel Arnaud, 16-4429.
(SAPOCO: "...appointed for large work-sites involving outside contractors..."
(EDMS#359026: "Les chefs de projets et/ou de groupes CERN responsables des travaux
se concertent avec la Commission TIS, Groupe Sécurité Générale (GS)
pour nommer des coordonnateurs chargés d'assurer le bon déroulement de la démarche de Coordination de la Sécurité.
Les coordonnateurs veillent à la mise en application à tous les stades du projet,
par tous les participants concernés, de toutes les mesures de sécurité nécessaires,
à l'exécution des travaux ainsi qu'à l'utilisation et à la maintenance ultérieure des ouvrages.
Les coordonnateurs agissent en étroite relation avec la Commission TIS, groupe GS,
qui doit être maintenue informée du déroulement de la démarche."
The TSO
(Territorial Safety Officer)
for the CMS Underground eXperimental Cavern (UXC) is
Maf Alidra, 16-0040
and for the Underground Service Cavern (USC) is
Sylvestre Dos Santos, 16-3706.
The TSO
for the Surface Experimental hall
(SX5 = B3585) is
Jean-Pierre Girod, 16-3703, while
that of the Surface Control room of the eXperiment
(SCX = B3562) is
Attila Racz, 16-5271.
You are encouraged to contact either your supervisor or your CERN Group Leader,
or Christoph, Austin, Wolfram, or Maf, or the relevant TSO, or even
the author of this document,
should any CMS-specific clarification be needed.
A reminder: the CERN general emergency number ("Pompiers") is 74444.
In the remainder of this document we only consider explicitly the risks associated with the CMS equipment at Interaction Point 5 (P5) at LHC, particularly related to working on the Electromagnetic Calorimeter and the Tracker, in which members of the RAL CMS team participates. We focus on hazards and risks particularly prevalent during the construction phase of CMS, both on the surface and underground. Many of the hazards are outside our formal direct personal control, although one must nevertheless be proactive in minimising the risk to oneself or others. The risks associated with standard office working at CERN main site should be broadly comparable to those whilst working in offices at RAL - one obvious exception being that when at CERN one is more likely to be working outside standard office hours, and appropriate care should be taken whenever working alone. Since March 2010 a defibrillator is kept in B40 (to your left as you enter the building, kept behing the counter).
Continuous Operation of electrical subdetector installations at P5, with no-one in situ underground requires prior certification by the CMS Technical Coordinator, Austin Ball, 16-0408, and GLIMOS, Christoph Schaefer, 16-0202. Achieving this certification usually includes an external review of Electrical Safety, and an internal review of the subdetector alarm Action Matrix.
Unattended Operation of electrical subdetector installations at P5 requires formal authorisation from the CMS Technical Coordinator, Austin Ball, 16-0408. In general such operation is refused. However, a CMS-wide Review for unattended operation, with "unattended" meaning "unattended by subdetector-expert at P5, but nevertheless attended by at least a CMS Shift-Leader and a CMS Technical Shifter (=cDCS Shifter)", was held on 03-May-10. Minutes of the meeting are on that Indico site. Both the Strip Tracker and EB/EE/ES were deemed "ready for unattended operation" from a Safety perspective, and they can now be operated in this manner.
Operation at P5 of Lasers or Laser diodes whose rating exceeds Class-1 requires formal authorisation from the CMS GLIMOS, Christoph Schaefer, 16-0202. We return to this subject at the end of Section 6.
There are designated Safety Link Persons
for the various components of CMS.
"Safety Linkmen are appointed by and are accountable to their Group Leader, with
the agreement of the Divisional Safety Officer (DSO). Their names are included in
the Divisional Safety Plan. They are expected to be in close daily contact with, and
knowledgeable about, all those aspects of the Group's work for which they have
been given a Safety responsibility.
Their principal duties as linkmen are:
The complete (but out-of-date) list of CMS Safety Link Persons is available
here.
Of particular interest to members of the RAL group:
Particular additional aspects pertaining to underground working at CMS are given in Section 6.
This document will need updating:
We remind staff that all safety signs at P5 must be adhered to, e.g.
An extensive First-Aid Box is kept in the single-storey surface building (SY5 = B3590) at the main gate of the P5 site. This is now also equipped with a defibrillator & medical oxygen. Outside standard working hours there is "break-glass" access to the key to this building. This building is also the Assembly Point for the P5 site, in any emergency.
Since March 2010, a First-Aid Box has been installed in the Surface Control Room, and additional First-Aid Equipment (including defibrillator) has been installed outside the toilets of the Surface Control Room. The locations of underground First-Aid Boxes are described in the Level 4C training, e.g. at the entrances to the big "PM54" lift, e.g. near the "Oxy-Box" cupboards in UXC, e.g. just inside one of the doors of the (temporary) Underground Control Room (UCR).
Since Jan 2009, during LHC shutdowns there is an underground defibrillator & medical oxygen
in the Red Oxy-Box cupboard at the -ve (UXC main shaft)
end of the X3 (beam-height) Near balcony in UXC ("break-glass" access).
The location of this equipment during LHC operation is still to be defined
(likely in/near underground control room).
CERN Level-2 First-Aid training (slides of
Day-1 and
Day-3)
includes training in the use of
defibrillator and medical oxygen during Cardio-Pulmonary-Resuscitation (CPR).
There is also a CERN Video giving
training in the use of defibrillator.
(Latest (2009) CPR recommendation is
30 chest compressions (@100 per minute) to 2 breaths (@1Hz)).
Presently (Jan 2009) ~15 members of CMS have CERN Level-2 training:
names to be posted on the front of the underground defibrillator cupboard,
including
Maf Alidra 16-0040 [normally in UXC],
Marc Favre 16-2900 [normally at P5],
Ken Bell 16-0746 (ECAL),
Andre David 16-3849 (ECAL),
Mimo Dattola 16-4268 (MUON),
Andrea Gaddi 16-4604,
Christoph Schaefer 16-0202 [often at P5],
Austin Ball 16-0408.
Additional care should obviously be taken if working outside hours. This should never be attempted on your own at P5, given the multiplicity and variability of the hazards. But even if not intentionally on your own, part of being on shift may involve an extended tour on your own, checking the status of various items. If so, plan appropriately:
You are also hereby informed that there are various video cameras and web-cams in operation at P5, e.g. by the main entrance, in the main surface- and underground-caverns, in the underground control room, and probably also elsewhere.
Winter 2008:
Comments on, and suggestions as to how to improve, this document are most welcome, and should be directed to Ken Bell. [Most links to CCLRC or RAL do work from off those sites without needing PPTP, but do require a valid CCLRC UserName/PassWord (ignore any complaints about "certificates"). But some STFC-era documentation now does require PPTP from offsite. The CCLRC web-based incident reporting system (SHE Enterprise) is presently hosted at DL - however Word/PDF versions of the CCLRC Accident Report Form are accessible with PPTP.]
5) P5 Specifics
P5 is a complex area, with many unrelated activities being carried out in parallel, by teams of many nationalities and of very varied background, culture, experience and capability. Not everyone working in the area may show the same level of safety awareness as yourself. Therefore staying safe requires a high level of personal vigilance and may require proactive behaviour. In particular
As of Jul-10, I'm unaware at SX5 (CMS Surface hall) of
6) Additional Underground Specifics
XXX Martin Gastal UXC Talk Since December 2006, territorial responsibility for the CMS underground caverns, including safety issues, is formally the responsibility of PH Department.
Before commencing underground working, it is recommended that one reminds oneself
of the contents of the CMS Level-4C safety training,
and of Christoph Schaefer's recent Plenary Safety talks:
December 2006;
February 2007;
June 2007;
September 2007;
December 2007;
February 2008;
September 2008;
December 2008;
March 2009;
March 2009 near misses;
June 2009 (last 3 slides);
December 2009;
March 2100 (radiation protection etc).
In particular,
safety shoes, helmets and helmet-lamp (or torch; depracated) are mandatory, as is authorisation
of ones request to work there
(requests to Christoph via EDH/Access-Request:
"LHC Installation Access 07H/21H (LHCI-12)" for 07:00-21:00,
"LHC Installation Special Hours (LHCI-24)" in addition (I believe) for 21:00-07:00).
Sometime later this summer (2008), the required Access authorisation will change to
"CMS Underground (CMS_U)",
and you need a special token, available from B55 (Archana email of 01-May-08).
Perhaps later you will also need your dosimeter.
Except for authorised visits, one should only be working underground on a "needs be" basis.
Although not mandatory, it would certainly be prudent to carry a mobile phone.
Similarly it would be prudent not to work alone underground.
All underground activities must be part of a Work Package. These are organised for CMS by TS-LEA, usually Martin Gastal, 16-3702, and a CERN Risk Assessment is done (forms completed by TS-LEA). Before commencing work a joint inspection (VIC = "Visite d'Inspection Commune") (Work Package Leader with CMS Safety Coordinator in TS, now Emmanuel Paulat, 16-3870) takes place.
Underground experimental areas present a number of problems and dangers that are normally of reduced importance in surface areas (confinement, remote situation, size of the experiment apparatus). As a consequence of this, safety regulations and recommendations are much more strict and have to be respected more strictly than on the surface. A Chapter (technically split into parts I, II and III) of the Safety Guide for Experiments at CERN is devoted to underground working.
The Underground eXperimental Cavern (UXC) is presently (January 2008) still to be considered a construction site, and not all the ultimate safety infrastructure has yet been commissioned. Water hydrants and fire extinguishers are operational, as is the UXC-wide foam extinguishing system. The AUGs (Arrêts d'Urgence Généraux, General Emergency Stops, see CERN IS5) are installed and are operational, and there is basic automatic smoke detection. Smoke detectors in the Tracker and ECAL LV racks in UXC have been commissioned and tested, and should cut the power back at its source. However, the efficacy of these smoke detectors is limited until the closure of the rack volumes is improved.
The safety infrastructure in the Underground Service Cavern (USC) is in better shape. Automatic smoke detection for the USC cavern (Level-3 alarm) is operational. Automatic smoke detection and over-temperature detection for all individual USC racks is operational (i.e. rack power gets cut). Automatic fire suppression in 80 racks is installed, and at least close to operational. In most USC racks, over-temperature now triggers a cut of electrical power. The USC AUGs are operational, as are the evacuation buttons.
Before commencing work underground, one should make oneself aware of any local alarm buttons, (e.g. Emergency Stops ("Arrets d'Urgence") (picture), and of the escape routes from where you are working (standard CERN green signs). The "Level-3" alarm siren is loud and distinctive (= piercing & disorientating), and may be accompanied by flashing orange lights. If the Level-3 alarm sounds you should immediately evacuate the underground area. The PM54 and PM56 access shafts near either end of UXC/USC both contain an adjacent lift and stairs, each encased in 15cm of reinforced concrete, and both deliberately kept at over-pressure (to keep out any smoke or fumes). The "safe zones" (French "sas" = air-lock) at the underground entrances to each lift/stairs are also kept at over-pressure. The lifts and the air-supply are both on backed-up power. Thus the PM54/PM56 lifts SHOULD be used in case of emergency, assuming they are still operational. Use the staircase if the lift is out of order. If you are unable to do either, then wait in the safe zone (which is also encased in concrete and is behind a fire-door). Once on the surface you should go to the P5 Assembly Point (SY5 = B3590), the single-storey building at the main gate of the P5 site. Once at SY5, you can now (2010) "badge" youself as having been present, on the external RFID-reader at the corner nearest CMS, and then leave the area - the fire brigade thereby have a record that you've come up to the surface.
When working underground ensure you know who your local first-aider is (e.g. Ken Bell 16-0746 (ECAL), Maf Alidra 16-0040, Andre David 16-3849 (ECAL), Sandro Di Vincenzo 16-4055, Marc Favre 16-2900, Andrea Gaddi 16-4604, Karl Gill 16-4712 (TK), Armando Lanaro 16-4257 (CSCs), Pascal Petiot 16-3129, Christoph Schaefer 16-0202; all of whom either are or have been CERN-trained First Aiders, and spend significant time at P5). A complete list of CERN-trained First Aiders in PH Department is given (but somewhat infrequently updated) here. Magnus Hansen keeps a printed copy of the CMS subset on the wall of the underground control room. The telephone numbers for the CERN Infirmary (open 08:00-17:30 Monday-Friday) are 73476 and 73802. The non-emergency telephone number for the CERN "Pompiers" is 74848.
A possible issue for anyone working underground, particularly in the early days of CMS installation, is that the air is rather heavily laden with concrete dust. Thus anyone asthmatic should consider taking their inhaler underground, at least on their first few visits, in case they react adversely. Similarly, anyone susceptible to dermatitis or inflammation of the eyes should watch out for any adverse reaction on their first few visits (for dermatitis, one might wear thin gloves or put on barrier cream before going underground).
Extreme care must be exercised in UXC in its present incomplete state. There are many teams working simultaneously on the detector, many of which are working at height, and the teams may often need to access the same areas. The weekly Tuesday- and Friday-morning Technical Coordination meetings endeavour to remove obvious direct conflicts, by rescheduling the work as appropriate. Also, the general level of tidiness and cleanliness is sometimes not wonderful, heightening the likelihood of encountering hazards (particularly trip/slip hazards). In UXC there is the additional hazard that floor plates or I-beams covering zones such as the cable chains may have been removed to allow access/working, and someone may have forgotten to cordon off the zone.
The "tsar" of UXC activity is Wolfram Zeuner, 16-2541, who should be fully aware of all activity in UXC, and should be able to answer most of your questions, although the GLIMOS remains "gospel" on safety issues.
The "tsar" of USC activity is Magnus Hansen, 16-4046. Contact Magnus to find out the status of the infrastructure in USC, and the current rules for installing or powering equipment in USC. The situation is evolving rapidly. If you work regularly in USC, Magnus will make you read and sign his 1-page document "Personal Safety Rules for Users working in USC55".
Access may also be needed to other related underground areas. Ensure before you start work that your are aware of what particular regulations apply and of the locally heightened hazards, and act appropriately. E.g. if you have to work extensively under the false floors of USC or in the cable "labyrinth", then look out for low roof beams, the innumerable cable trays, the multitude of trip hazards, the increasing volume of installed cables and fibre-optics, and the poor egress/ingress.
Beryllium
(CERN and
a supplier's links).
The central 6m long section of the CMS beam-pipe is made of Beryllium.
Beryllium is commonly chosen for such usage, in order to make the beam-pipe
be as transparent as possible to particles traversing it.
However care should be taken whenever working near this central section:
Lasers
(CERN
and
RAL (CCLRC)
Laser Safety documentation).
The CMS LASER Safety Officer (LSO) is David Bailleux, 16-4241, with Vasken Hagopian of Florida State University (and of HCAL-LASER-System) his Deputy.
The CMS Tracker, and corresponding ECAL, optical links are now classified as Class-1, as is described in Karl Gill's documentation. I believe the optical links of the other CMS sub-detectors are similarly also Class-1. Additionally, the ECAL and HCAL have monitoring systems consisting of powerful (Class-4 (visible & Infra-Red) and Class-3B (UV-A, 337nm) respectively) Lasers injecting light into a (closed) network of optical fibres, and the Tracker and Muon systems have alignment systems utilising powerful (Class-XXX (Laser diode, Infra-Red, ~1075nm) and Class-3B (visible, ~670nm) respectively) Lasers. The RAL group has no formal responsibility for any Laser monitoring or alignment system. However, members of the group will participate in the commissioning phase of the ECAL, which itself includes commissioning the Laser monitoring system. Any RAL personnel working with Lasers should have been appropriately trained and have read and be fully conversant with CCLRC Safety Code #1 (Laser Safety), 2004 and CERN Safety Instruction #22, 1994 ("Rules for the safe use of Lasers at CERN"). An eye-test is usually mandatory before working seriously with lasers. The CERN-based Responsible of the ECAL Laser monitoring system is David Bailleux of Minnesota/Caltech, 16-4241, (an engineer), with physicist back-up of Adi Bornheim of Caltech, 16-2343. The ECAL Laser system comprises two Class-4 Lasers emitting respectively visible and infra-red pulsed light, and associated pumping lasers. The light then travels down ~10m of optical fibres to a set of optical switches. This part of the system is all inside a Designated Laser Area (DLA) (the "ECAL LASER Barrack"), situated immediately below the CMS underground control room. From the switch the Laser light passes, in turn, through 88 quartz optical fibres, each typically ~100m long and wrapped in protective sheathing (and for most of its path inside additional black plastic trunking), to 2x36 half Supermodules of EB and 2x8 half quadrants of EE, where the light passes through more fibres and two stages of diffuser before reaching the ~80k individual crystals of EB/EE. Standard Laser operation should be at ~100Hz. The ECAL Laser system was inspected in August 2007 by Roland Magnier, formerly responsible in the Safety Commission for Lasers at CERN. His Inspection Report listed various modifications to be carried out. In an Email reply later that day, the CMS GLIMOS stated that he considers the ECAL Laser installation as approved, as soon as the requested modifications have been carried out. Initial commissioning of the Laser system into each EB Supermodule used a lower-power (Class-2) visible Laser, to verify the integrity of each installed set of 100m of quartz fibres from the DLA to the Supermodule, before connecting the fibres to the output of the switch inside the DLA. Once the relevant hardware and software is fully commissioned and timed in, it is envisaged that ECAL Data Quality Monitoring (DQM) software will be used in future on the first shot to each Supermodule, each time a standard Laser Run begins, to re-verify the integrity of connection.
Presently, 05-Jul-10, I'm unaware underground at P5 of
